Why Ban Drugs? Part V: Japan
Japan, much like Korea, is a nation with rather strict drug laws. Like the other three countries so far, which have all been wealthy liberal democracies, Japan has the full capacity to exercise whatever policy it chooses, and so chooses to strictly prohibit drug use from every angle, including presence in blood, in the case of methamphetamine. Like any good nation in the shadow of Confucian civilisation, it recognises that self-harm is collective harm, and pursues infringement with the concern one would expect from such an understanding. Many commentators insist that Japanese success is the result of their culture, in some nebulous, often absolutist fashion. But culture is after all nothing more than learned behaviour, and as this series will hopefully demonstrate, the law is as great a teacher of public morality as any instrument available to society. The Japanese have had their drug epidemics, generally caused by loopholes in law, which have allowed undocumented drugs to proliferate. These have been stamped out with a vengeance.
The majority of governing frameworks, informal institutional cultures and social networks have retained a steady commitment to the same values since the early 1950s – a compromise between authoritarian consensus and American democratic decentralisation. Its strict normative consensus on drugs and drug culture has remained unchanged until very recently, and then not substantially. At a time when the rest of the world is approaching a consensus of drugs as health problem[1], Japan remains conservative. This comes from a collective and institutional memory of dealing with the post-war drugs crisis, measures for combating which were derived from prior historical periods. At no stage have the Japanese institutions engaged in speculative policy shifts or radical changes to their understanding of how to cope with drug abuse, and have instead drawn on historical experience or the successes of others.
Like much of East Asia, the Japanese associate drug trafficking with foreigners and moral corruption. Unlike China however, Japan participated in the trafficking, by creating a state monopoly on opium, which it sold exclusively to foreign client states like Taiwan and Korea[2], using a gradual suppression policy in their colonies to remarkable success[3]. Seeing the effect of the opium wars on China, and seeking to expand and strengthen the nation, the Meiji Empire strictly forbade the import of narcotics[4], and kept their population from experiencing the deleterious effects opium had on China. Until American occupation, the Japanese state was highly centralised, authoritarian and reinforced by ubiquitous spying. Employing the expertise of Oscar Olander and Lewis Valentine (rural and urban police specialists respectively), General MacArthur ordained a decentralised system whereby towns larger than 5000 would raise their own police forces, and limited their activities to keeping the peace, investigating crimes, and defending life and property[5]. While this saw initial resistance from establishment conservatives, the payoff was so dramatically positive in terms of crime reduction and police-public relations, that it was treated as nothing short of a miracle[6].
The community policing regime and their extremely tight-knit, public-facing departments became the main tool for combating crime, though serious systemic differences to the West obtain here. The approach to criminal rehabilitation has been termed “reintegrative shaming”[7]. This is distinct from a stigma – shame is temporary and contingent on change in character. Offenders are expected to accept the community’s terms of reintegration, and their families are expected to assist. This shared responsibility model is shared by the police: when one officer breaches conduct, his superior often resigns[8]. The Yoshida administration were enthusiastic collaborators with the United States[9], but the political parties and Yoshida himself were extremely conservative. Except for the fringe Communist Party, there was incredible cross-party homogeneity[10].
This cultural consensus on cooperation and the common good show through in the synergy between civil society and administration on the first amphetamine crisis. Under American occupation, while nonmedical opium and cannabis were prohibited, stimulants were not. This led to an uncontrolled proliferation of private companies selling the product openly, generating a massive epidemic[11]. National attention was drawn to the problem after a schoolgirl was found dead and raped in a school bathroom, the victim of a hiropon (methamphetamine) addict, and the incident became the catalyst of a nationwide civil society effort to call for a dramatic response. It was the culmination of years of national distress at a skyrocketing problem of addiction, delinquency and death[12]. The legislature for controlling the epidemic, and expanding the mental health system was drafted by Dr. Kaneko Junji, the man responsible for having introduced Western psychiatry to Japan. Junji saw drug abuse and other deviant lifestyles to be precursors of anti-community behaviour such as support for revolutionary ideologies and other disruptive forces[13]. This is in context with a generally held belief that the methamphetamine epidemic would destroy Japan. The rapid and effective manner it was dealt with has shaped subsequent drug policy and cultural values[14]. Today, public shaming of celebrities for drug abuse is standard practice. Those caught engaging in what is deemed immoral behavior often have to publicly apologise for the poor example they set for society, forego their careers, and seek treatment for their habit.
Japan’s drug policy regime is quite stable. Almost all of its substance control legislation was passed under the same administration - The Cannabis Control Act of 1948; The Stimulant Control Act of 1951; The Poisonous and Deleterious Substances Control Law of 1952; The Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Act of 1953 and the The Opium Control Act of 1954. All of these constitute “Special Laws”, which augment the 1907 Criminal Code and the 1948 Code of Criminal Procedure. The police are augmented by a contingent of narcotics officers deputised to the Ministry of Health, with special investigation powers[15]. Punishments are harsh, and traffickers and dealers of methamphetamine can receive 10 years in prison[16].
The history of the regime is widely seen to be composed of three epidemics, driven by methamphetamine, the most popular illegal drug in Japan[17]. The second wave, in the 1960s, was fuelled by organised crime. This was responded to with a crackdown, leading to a spike in arrest figures, followed by a fall in drug activity indicators [18]. Special problem districts saw an increase in police presence, school route security and spot inspections[19]. This "second wave" was responded to with a swift and sustained police pressure. But in the 90’s, abuse and trade spread to schools[20]. This third wave, because of its sensitive pattern of abuse, was approached with a series of regularly updated strategies called “five-year plans”, characterised by increased focus on education and awareness. Special surveys on students, and well as police arrest records, indicated effectiveness, leading to a redoubling of finance and refinement of strategies, including extending the programs to universities, where increased use in the 21st century had begun to raise alarms[21].
These have been directed from the cabinet of the Prime Minister himself, under the auspices of the Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures to Prevent Drug Abuse, which accounts for the far-reaching capacity of these plans, which have focused a great deal on promoting awareness and anti-drug norms at schools[22]. “The Headquarters”, as they wish to be referred to, have on their directing board, members from every major branch of the civil service, incorporating trafficking prevention through not only customs and security, but through international diplomacy to solicit cooperation[23]. This centralized, interdepartmental approach has helped reproduce the policy regime through almost every institution, ensuring that the consensus cannot be disrupted by political entrepreneurs. These reports often refer to “foreign undesirables” as a trafficking threat, particularly Iranian gangs and Koreans with connections to the communist regime, which manufactures a large quantity of methamphetamine[24].
With the exception of the five-year plans, the major policy departure in the 21st century has been tackling new drugs such as “legal herbs” - synthetic cannabinoids mainly - which have resulted in the 2006 amendment to the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law. It was again amended in 2014, to control new designer drugs which escaped regulation; this being triggered by the deaths from overdose exceeding 100 in 20[25]. However, methamphetamine remains the primary focus of efforts. While insisting on strict prevention strategies, in the past decade, there has been increased effort placed into addiction treatment facilities[26]. This has been directed by a similar, cooperative approach to other Japanese policy changes, with members of highly diverse departments of both government and civil society partaking in local institutions, like the Osaka Addiction Centre[27].
Overall, Japan is characterised by a high sensitivity to any increase in consumption of narcotics, which is usually responded to rapidly, with the cooperation of many layers of society. The recognition of this cooperative consensus has made it difficult to destabilise. However, in the last 20 years, policing has become more difficult, as anti-drug norms are breaking down among young people. Western norms are also starting to filter in, changing the drugs of choice, and the number of experimental users[28]. For those in their 20s, many who have travelled overseas report having tried drugs, and the proliferation of new technologies, such as cellphone communication and the internet, have made acquiring illicit substances significantly easier[29].
Nevertheless, all drug use indicators, from drug seizures to opinion polls show that Japan, like its other wealthy Asian neighbours uses and trafficks in far lower volumes than the West does. While much of this can be put down to cultural attitudes, the evidence suggests that patterns of use are responsive to changes in law and law enforcement strategies, which indicates that, as a dimension of the nation's culture, the policing of illegal substances may well be something capable of importing to the West, if only the political will were present. Japan’s policy regime may be summarised as being based on considered amendment to existing strategies, and is responsive in nature. It was developed out of a traditional understanding of what works, and what is desirable in society. New strategies are generally based on prior experience and common understanding, and responsive to changes in the prevalence and kind of abuse in society.
References:
[1] United Nations General Assembly Special Session, resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19th April (2016)
[2] Brook, Timothy, and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds. Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952. Univ of California Press, 2000;
Jennings, John M. The opium empire: Japanese imperialism and drug trafficking in Asia, 1895-1945. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997;
Kingsberg, Miriam. "Abstinent Nation, Addicted Empire: Opium and Japan in the Meiji Period." The Social History of Alcohol and Drugs 25, no. 1-2 (2011)
[3] Kingsberg, 2011 “From […] 6.3 percent of the population of Taiwan, the number of registered smokers declined to [0.5 percent of the population] in 1930.” (p. 101-102)
[4] Jennings, 1997: 2-3 At the same time, opium sales were promoted in China, explicitly to demoralise her.
[5] Chwialkowski, Paul. "Japanese policing-an American invention." Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 21, no. 4 (1998)
[6] Holyst, Brunon. Comparative criminology. Lexington Books, 1979: 107; Japan is in fact the only country other than Switzerland which did not experience an upward trend in crime since WWII.
[7] Braithwaite, John. Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge University Press, 1989: 61
[8] Bayley, David H. Forces of order: Policing modern Japan. Univ of California Press, 1991: 156
[9] Buckley, Roger. Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945-1952. Cambridge university press, 1982: 247
[10] Buckley, Roger. Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945-1952. Cambridge university press, 1982: 250
[11] Kingsberger, 2013: 143
[12] Kingsberger, 2013: 140
[13] Matsumura, Janice. "Mental health as public peace: Kaneko Junji and the promotion of psychiatry in modern Japan." Modern Asian Studies 38, no. 4 (2004)
[14] Kingsberger, 2013; Alexander, 2013; Edström, 2015
[15] Vaughn, Michael S., Frank FY Huang, and Christine Rose Ramirez. "Drug Abuse and Anti-Drug Policy in Japan: Past History and Future Directions." The British Journal of Criminology 35, no. 4 (1995): 499
[16] Tamura, Masayuki. "Japan: stimulant epidemics past and present." Bulletin on narcotics 41, no. 1-2 (1989): 85
[17] Wada, Kiyoshi, Masahiko Funada, Toshihiko Matsumoto, and Takuya Shimane. "Current status of substance abuse and HIV infection in Japan." Journal of food and drug analysis 21, no. 4 (2013): S33-S36;
Yamamoto, J. "Recent trends of drug abuse in Japan." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1025, no. 1 (2004): 430-438.
[18] Vaughn et al, 1995: 500;
Edström, 2015
[19] Nakamori, Yasushi, Daiki Wada, and Masatoshi Kyo. "Emerging Risks of New Types of Drug Addiction in Japan." Mental Health in Family Medicine 13 (2017): 480-485
[20] Yamamoto, 2004
[21] Kitagaki, Kunihiko. “The Current Status of and Measures against Drug Abuse in Japan” Japanese Medical Association Journal 54, no. 3 (2011): 168–171,
[22] Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures to Prevent Drug Abuse, Five-Year Drug Abuse Prevention Strategy in Japan, 1998-2002. (1998)
[23] Council for Promoting Measures to Prevent Drug Abuse, The Fourth Five-Year Drug Abuse Prevention Strategy, (2013)
[25] Nakamori et al, 2017; Wada, 2011
[26] Wada, 2013
[27] Nakamori, 2017
[28] Wada, 2013
[29] Council for Promoting Measures to Prevent Drug Abuse, 2013